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1  REPORT OVERVIEW 
1.1  Introduction 
According to  the  ONP  Framework Amendment Directive  (97/51/EC) the  EU 
Commission  must,  as  part  of  its  1999  Telecommunications  review, 
"investigate  the  added  value  of the  setting  up  of a  European  Regulatory 
Authority to  carry those tasks which  would  prove to  be  better undertaken at 
the Community level." 
Eurostrategies  and  Cullen  International  have  been  instructed  by  the 
Commission to carry out that project on the Value Added of an  EU Regulator. 
We hereby submit our Report. 
1.2  Terms of Reference 
The Terms of Reference calls for: 
•  A  broad  survey  of players  in  the  Telecommunications  sector  as  to: 
•  areas  where  further  regulatory  action  was  felt  necessary  at  a 
European level; 
•  within which framework such action was needed; 
•  the  need  if  any for  streamlining  current  regulatory  structures 
within the European Union. 
•  Overview of the  current division of regulatory responsibilities between 
Member  States,  NRAs,  Competition  Authorities,  the  European 
Commission, the CEPT, the ITU and WRC. 
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In  order  to  carry  out  the  survey,  Eurostrategies  was  asked  to  target 
plus/minus  300  organisations  and  to  undertake  face-to-face  interviews  and 
provide a written questionnaire. 
•  Formulation of Recommendations 
Eurostrategies was to provide: 
•  Inventory  of  key  areas  requiring  further  action  within  the 
European framework and or at a national level:  and the level at 
which action was felt most appropriate; 
•  Provide an  assessment of the level of support of the creation of 
a European Regulatory Authority and its role; 
•  Make  an  assessment of the  value  added  of such  an  authority 
compared with streamlining current structures; 
•  Indication of where current structures may be streamlined; 
•  Presentation of scenarios for future action. 
It was  also envisaged that,  prior to  submission of the Final  Report,  a public 
workshop  in  Brussels  would  be  held  so  that  the  findings  and 
Recommendations of the Report could be put to public test. 
2  REGULATORY OVERVIEW 
2.1  The Need for Regulation 
Telecommunications  is  a  sector  which  has  been  deemed  to  warrant 
regulatory  control.  Across  the  world,  it  has  generally  been  viewed  as  a 
commercial  activity  which  should  not  be  left  entirely  to  the  forces  of  the 
market and the workings of the general competition law.  It is  held to require 
sector specific  regulation.  Below  are  set  out some  of the  key  reasons  for 
such regulatory control. 
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•  Public Safety 
•  Fair Competition 
•  Allocation of Scarce Resources 
•  Protection of Consumer Interests 
2.2  Regulatory Principles 
The role of the  regulatory authority needs to be  set in  the context of a clear set of 
principles, thus: 
Regulation should: 
•  promote and ensure the long term interests of consumers in terms of price, 
quality and range of services; 
•  be an enabler of change; 
•  encourage investment; 
•  encourage efficient outcomes; 
•  tend towards technology neutrality; 
•  be flexible, to allow for convergence; 
•  be consistent with competition law; 
•  provide for an  efficient means of managing scarce resources; 
•  build  into  itself  the  potential  for  its  own  obsolescence:  market-based 
competition should be the goal. 
2.3  Policy/Regulation 
Broadly it may be stated that policy is made by the Ministry (the Government): 
implementing  and  monitoring  the  achievement  of  that  policy  is  the 
responsibility of the regulatory body. 
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The  Ministry  makes  policy  on  such  matters  as:  separation  of Posts  and 
Telecommunications;  corporatisation  of  the  incumbent  operator;  on 
privatisation;  on  licensing  regimes;  on  the  establishment of an  approvals 
regime. 
It  will  be  the  role  of the  regulatory  authority to  monitor licences,  to  amend 
licences,  to  enforce  licences,  to  operate a numbering  plan,  to  operate tariff 
policy,  to  determine interconnection  issues,  etc.  The  regulatory authority is 
concerned with day-to-day control of the sector- so far as that is necessary. 
In  general it may be argued that the more that Governments wish the sector 
to  be  opened  or liberalised,  the  more  responsibilities will  be  passed  to  the 
regulatory function as opposed to the policy function of the Ministry. 
2.4  EU and NRAs 
The  effect  of telecommunications  legislation  results  in  regulatory  authority 
within  the  Member States  devolving  upon  a  National  Regulatory  Authority. 
The  EU  first  called  for  a  separate  regulatory  authority  in  the  Services 
Directive. Article 7 states: 
Member States  shall ensure  that  from  July  1991  the  grant of operating 
licences,  the  control of type  approval and mandatory  specifications,  the 
allocation of  frequencies and surveillance of  usage conditions are carried out 
by  a body independent of  telecommunications organisations. 
The status and role of this National Regulatory Authority has later been more 
clearly  set  out  in  Section  Sa  of the  Amended  Framework  Directive,  which 
states that: 
1.  Where  the  tasks  assigned  to  the  National  Regulatory  Authority  in 
Community legislation  are  undertaken  by more  than  one  body,  Member 
States shall ensure that the  tasks to be undertaken by each body are made 
public. 
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2.  In  order to guarantee the independence of  national regulatory authorities: 
national regulatory authorities shall be legally distinct from  and functionally 
independent  of all  organisations  providing  telecommunications  networks, 
equipment or services,  Member States that retain  ownership or a significant 
degree  of control of organisations  providing  telecommunications  networks 
and/or services shall ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory 
function from activities associated with ownership or control. 
3.  Member States  shall ensure  that suitable  mechanisms  exist at national 
level under which  a party affected by a  decision of the  national regulatory 
authority has a right of  Appeal to a body independent of  the parties involved. 
4.  Member  States  may  take  steps  to  ensure  that  national  regulatory 
authorities  are  able  to  obtain  from  organisations  providing 
telecommunications networks and/or services all the  information  necessary 
for them to apply Community legislation. 
EU Directives establish that the National Regulatory Authority may be a single 
body or more  than  one  body.  Indeed,  in  most  Member States  there  is  a 
division  of  responsibility  at  a  regulatory  level  between  the  Ministry,  the 
telecommunications  regulatory  authority  and,  in  some  countries,  a 
radiocommunications authority. 
3  THE SURVEY 
3.1  Extent of Survey 
One  of  the  key  purposes  of  the  study  is  to  establish  the  views  of  the 
telecommunications  players.  In  order  to  provide  a  broad  and  balanced 
survey,  EurostrategiesiCullen  International  set  out  a  breakdown  of  the 
organisations  and  persons  to  be  questioned. 
categorised thus: 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International 
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•  Ministries and NRAs; 
•  Incumbent operators and their subsidiaries; 
•  Mobile operators; 
•  New entrants; 
•  Resellers; 
•  Independent service providers; 
•  Users and user associations 
•  Consumers associations 
3.2  The Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was  prepared  and  submitted to  the  European  Commission. 
The questionnaire after analysis and discussion was agreed. 
The content of the questionnaire covered the following 15 topics thus: 
1.  Development of a pan European market; 
2.  Licensing public telecommunication networks and services; 
3.  General authorisations or class licences; 
4.  Operators with Significant market power; 
5.  Interconnection; 
6.  Competition; 
7.  Universal service; 
8.  Frequency allocation and assignment; 
9.  Consumer protection; 
10.  Tariff control; 
11.  Number management and allocation; 
12.  Internet; 
13.  Enforcement; 
14.  Appeal; 
15.  Other  functions  which  would  need  a  sector  regulator. 
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Across the questionnaire there were 5 or 6 main questions for each topic: 
•  How important is the task? 
•  How  does  NRA  and/or  other  national  bodies  manage  this 
objective? 
•  Reasons for assessment (as above); 
•  Is the national regulatory structure efficient to manage this task? 
•  At what level should this objective be addressed? 
•  If the objective should be addressed at other than national level, 
what type of organisation? 
•  What level of regulatory control? 
In  some of the topics,  questions were asked  in  particular to the topics under 
consideration. 
The questionnaire was sent to 462 respondents.  194 replied, broken down thus: 
•  Ministries and NRAs 
•  Incumbents and incumbents' subsidiaries 
•  New entrants 
•  Users, consumers, manufacturers 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International 
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4  ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE 
AND INTERVIEWS 
4.1  Overall Analysis 
4.1.1  Importance of Regulatory Area 
The following  chart  provides an  overview of where the  respondents  believe 
that the regulatory area is highly important.  As can be seen 70%)  (or more) of 
the respondents considered four regulatory areas to be highly important. 
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Figure 4-1. The Importance of the Regulatory Topic 
The four highest ranked regulatory areas were: 
•  Competition 
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•  Interconnection 
•  Frequency allocation and assignment 
•  Number management and allocation 
The market sees issues surrounding Competition as the most important. 
Conversely the regulatory areas ranked as being of less importance were: 
•  Tariff control 
•  Internet 
4.1.2  How does NRA and/or other national bodies manage regulatory 
responsibilities? 
As demonstrated in  the following  chart,  the  majority of respondents consider 
regulation of the four most important regulatory areas at a national level to be 
average/good.  However,  a significant minority considered  the  regulation  to 
be poor. 
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IJGood 
II  Average 
II  Poor 
In  only  Public  licensing,  General  licensing,  USO,  Frequency  management, 
Consumer protection and Numbering did a third (or more) of the respondents 
consider that management by the NRA was good. 
The  respondents  were  less  favourable  about  the  abilities  of  the  National 
Regulatory Authorities to manage Interconnection.  Only 28% considered the 
management of this topic to be 'good' by the NRA. 
The overall response was that NRAs were managing to  an  average level  of 
satisfaction. 
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Figure 4-3. How well is the topic regulated? (data) 
4.1.3  Is the national regulatory structure efficient to manage regulatory 
requirements? 
Throughout the responses, despite certain reservations expressed as to how 
well  areas were regulated  at a national level,  the efficiency of the regulatory 
structure to achieve most of the various objectives attracted in  or about 50% 
level  of  confidence  as  was  the  case  with  the  four  most  important  topics 
identified. 
The overall response is summarised below thus: 
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Figure 4-4. Efficiency of National Regulatory Scheme (data) 
4.1.4  At what level should regulatory requirements be addressed? 
For each topic, the respondent was asked at what level regulation should  be 
applied.  The categories of permitted answer were: 
•  National 
•  EU (15 States) 
•  Wider than the EU 
•  Self-regulation 
•  Don't know 
•  No answer (blank) 
We have taken the  responses to each topic and  have produced conclusions 
set out in the following chart which illustrates the support, on  average, for the 
various options. 
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At what level should regulatory measures be applied? 
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Figure 4-5. At what level should regulatory measures be applied? 
There was broad support for the national level as the appropriate platform for 
addressing the various issues. 
The major departures from this consensus were the topics of the Internet and 
Development of a Pan-European telecommunications market. 
EU Role 
There was strong support for an  EU  role  in  the areas of Development of a 
Pan-European telecommunications market, for SMP, for Interconnection and 
Competition. 
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Wider than EU 
There was little support for a platform wider than the EU, with the exception of 
management  of the  Internet for which  46%>  of respondents  thought  that  a 
wider than EU level response was appropriate. 
Self  Regulation 
Self-regulation attracted very low support with only the Internet, Development 
of  a  Pan-European  market  and  Consumer  protection  getting  more  than 
modest backing. 
4.1.5  If regulatory requirements should be addressed at other than 
national level -what type of regulatory organisation(s)? 
We have taken the responses to each topic and  have produced conclusions 
set out  in  the  following  chart,  which  illustrates  the  average  support for the 
various options. 
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Figure 4-6. Preferred type of organisation 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International  Page 14 The highest support for a European  Regulatory Authority was in  the area  of 
Competition and there was medium and above support for an  ERA to control 
Interconnection and SMP (which are also both Competition-related areas). 
There was further support for a European Regulatory Authority in the areas of 
development of a Pan-European  market (45%),  Control  of operators  having 
SMP (45%) and Interconnection (49°/o). 
There was limited support for ad hoc initiatives and small support (save in the 
area of Frequency management) for a CEPT  -type body. 
4.1.6  If regulatory objectives should be addressed at other than 
national level -what level of regulatory control? 
When asked concerning the preferred type of regulatory control, the opinions 
of the  respondents  were  more  equally  divided  although  there  was  a  slight 
majority in favour of 'Binding decisions'. 
Except in the areas of Developing of a European telecommunications market, 
USO,  Consumer  protection  and  Internet,  most  respondents  chose  by  a 
narrow  margin  Binding  decisions  as  opposed  to  Guidance  and 
recommendation.  (There was a high level of no response to this question). 
Eurostrategies/Cullen  International consider that most respondents,  drawing 
on  their national  experience associate Regulation with  Binding decisions.  If 
therefore  regulatory  decisions  are  made  at an  EU  level  they would  expect 
them therefore to be binding (or become binding through national adaptation). 
In  an  emerging  market certainty  in  regulation  is  deemed  by  many to  be  of 
high value. 
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Figure 4-7. Preferred type of regulatory control (data) 
4.2  Regional Groups 
For this element of the report we have divided EU  Member States into three 
country  groupings.  These  groupings  have  been  determined  partly  from 
geography and partly on the responses received. 
The Groupings are: 
Northern  European,  consisting  of  Denmark,  Finland,  The 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (DK, Fl, NL, SE, UK); 
Central  comprising  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg (AT, BE, FR,  DE,  IE, LU); and 
Southern  European  comprising,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain 
(GR, IT, PT,  ES) 
4.2.1  Importance of Regulatory Area 
There is a high level of importance attached to the topics across all groupings 
except that Consumer protection, Tariff control,  USO and the Internet issues 
are considered to be  of modest importance in The Northern Group.  This may 
indicate a more developed market-orientated view amongst the  members of 
The Northern group. 
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In  all  groups  the  Development  of  a  Pan-European  market,  Control  of 
operators  having  SMP,  Interconnection,  Competition,  Frequency 
management,  Numbering  and  Enforcement  were  adjudged  to  be  of  high 
importance (50°/o or greater answering 'high'). 
Importance of Regulatory Topic- by Country 
Grouping 
lntercon n eel  Com petition  Spectrum  Numbering 
Figure 4-8. Importance of Regulatory Topic- by Country Grouping 
Consumer protection was regarded  of significantly higher importance in  The 
Southern Group than in the Central and Northern groups. 
In  the Nordic countries all  respondents expressed satisfaction with the liberal 
general  authorisation  scheme  that  these  countries  enjoy.  Where  these 
respondents  attach  low importance to  the  topic General  authorisations,  this 
was a reflection that this was seen as a non-issue. 
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4.2.2  How does NRA and/or other national bodies manage this 
objective? 
C1) 
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a. 
Average Dissatisfaction with NRA 
Northern  Middle  Southern 
Figure 4-9. Average dissatisfaction with NRA- by Country Grouping 
The  Northern  and  Central  groups  are  reasonably  comparable  in  their 
responses.  Taking  "good"  and  "average"  responses  together  there  is 
significantly high support for NRAs. 
In  The  Northern  Group  and  The  Central  Group,  there  are  no  overall 
responses such that more than a third are dissatisfied in any area except the 
Internet. 
However,  it  is  particularly  noted  that  The  Southern  Group,  (Greece,  Italy, 
Portugal  and  Spain)  does  not  find  that  the  management  of the  specified 
regulatory functions is  "good" to the  same degree as  the other two groups. 
Indeed there is considerable dissatisfaction in The Southern Group. 
Detailed Analysis 
The responses to  our questionnaire allowed  us to  undertake more particular 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International  Page 18 I 
I 
e5. 
Eurostrateg1es 
analysis  of  certain  key  areas,  i.e.  Licensing,  Interconnection,  Frequency, 
Tariffs, Numbering and Enforcement. 
We found as follows: 
•  Licensing 
Under this  heading,  78%  of The  Northern  Group  found  the  regime 
open  and  72%  found  that  it  was  fair.  In  The  Central  Group  these 
figures  are  40%  and  52%  respectively,  whereas  in  The  Southern 
Group the figures were 26% and 20%)  respectively. 
The  speed  of licensing  procedures  were  considered  to  be  slower in 
The Southern Group (44°/o) than in  the Central and Northern groups at 
14% and 16% answering 'slow' respectively. 
•  Interconnection 
Support for the operation of the Interconnection regime was higher in 
The  Northern  Group,  in  which  70°/o  stated  that they had  an  efficient 
regulatory structure. 
Less  than  a  third  (28%)  of  respondents  in  The  Southern  Group 
considered that cost accounting processes were in place and only 38°/o 
thought that the NRA was effective to deal with disputes. 
•  Frequency 
Just under a half of The Northern Group (48%) considered the system 
to be fair whilst in  The Southern Group it was substantially less (16%) 
and in The Central Group (38%). 
In all groups speed of procedure was considered to be modest. 
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More  respondents  in  The  Northern  Group  (48°/o)  considered  the 
Enforcement regime in their countries to be effective as opposed to the 
respondents  in  the  Central  and  Southern  groups  (32%)  and  30% 
respectively). 
•  Tariffs 
With  respect to  how closely tariffs  match  costs,  The  Northern  Group 
was  the  most  positive  at 25%.  In  contrast  to  this,  only 4°/o  of The 
Southern  Group  considered  tariffs  to  be  close  to  costs.  From  The 
Southern Group, 52%)  of respondents made a definitive statement that 
tariffs were not closely matched to costs. 
•  Number Management and Allocation 
There was some disparity between the groups on this point.  In general 
terms, however, The Northern Group was more positive. 
The  Northern  Group  considered  the  number assignment  procedures 
and fees to be good (52°/o answering 'good'), whereas only 18% of The 
Southern Group thought the procedures to be good. 
In  terms  of the  speed  of procedures,  45%  of The  Northern  Group thought 
them to  be  'quick'.  This contrasts with only 4%  of The Southern Group who 
thought the procedures to be 'quick'. 
4.2.3  If the objective should be addressed at other than national level -
what type of organisation(s)? 
Support  for  an  EU  Regulator  in  The  Northern  Group  varied  at  an  overall 
average  figure  of 31%.  Support for  individual  topics  varied  with  strongest 
support  being:  61%  for  Competition,  43%,  for  Interconnection,  40°/o  for 
Development of a Pan-European market, and 39% for Enforcement. 
Support from The Central  Group was  broadly similar to The Northern Group 
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with  the  average figure  being  32°/o.  Only in  the  area  of Competition  did  it 
exceed 50°/o support. 
The strongest support for a  European  Regulatory Authority came  from  The 
Southern Group (average of 48% support across all  topics).  Support for an 
ERA ranged  from  30% the  area  of the  Internet,  to  62°/o  for Interconnection 
and SMP.  Support was also strong (above 50%) in  the area of Development 
of a Pan-European regulatory market (60°/o) and Competition (54%). 
In The Southern Group, support for an  EU  Regulatory Authority is matched by 
the level of support for a national authority. 
4.3  Conclusion 
The  overall  results  from  the  survey  indicate  that  there  are  many  problem 
areas  across  regulatory  topics  and  Member States.  Where  problems  exist, 
there is  a strong tendency to look for a better solution at the European level. 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  a  strong  negative  correlation  between  the 
level of satisfaction with the performance of the NRAs and the level of support 
for  EU  involvement  in  general  and  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  in 
particular. 
Three observations may be noted in this regard: 
•  The  Southern  Group  of countries  have  a  significantly  lower level  of 
satisfaction than  The  Northern Group and  The Central Group.  At the 
same time, The Southern Group has significantly higher support for an 
ERA than the other groups; 
•  the  New operators,  across  all  geographic  regions,  are  less  satisfied 
with  the  performance  of  the  NRA  than  the  other  organisational 
categories. As a consequence, they are more in favour of an ERA; 
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•  the  analysis  of (dis)-satisfaction  with  NRA performance  by  regulatory 
topic indicates that there  are  great variations from  topic to  topic with 
regard to which countries are involved.  Yet, also this analysis shows a 
very consistent  pattern  of higher support for an  ERA where  there  is 
dissatisfaction. 
However,  the  level  of  (dis)-satisfaction  is  not  sufficient  to  generate  solid 
support for an  ERA.  In  the  survey,  the number of New operators outweigh 
Incumbents  by  six  to  one  and  constitutes  about  two  thirds  of  the  total 
population.  However,  only for Competition  does the  level  of support for an 
ERA reach above 50%. 
Independently of the influence of the level of satisfaction, there are significant 
differences  in  the  level  of support for an  ERA across the  regulatory topics. 
Two observations stand out: 
•  the regulatory topics associated with fair competition have significantly 
higher level  of support than  all  other topics (with the exception  of the 
development of a Pan-European market); 
•  the  development  of  a  Pan-European  market  does  not  only  draw 
relatively high support for an  ERA and European level involvement, but 
is  also seen as  one of the most important objectives.  Because it is  a 
horizontal  objective,  reaching  across  all  other  regulatory  topics,  it 
provides general support for initiatives at the European level to improve 
harmonisation. 
While  the  quantitative  surveys  results  indicate  support  for  a  European 
Regulatory Authority among  a significant minority,  it is  a general  impression 
from  face-to-face  interviews  that  even  among  this  minority  there  is  no 
significant  enthusiasm  for  creating  a  new  level  of  bureaucracy  at  the 
European level.  What most people indicate is for the European Commission 
to be more determined to use tools that are already available to them. 
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5  GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN REGULATORY BODIES 
5.1  Introduction 
In  the  telecommunications  sector  historically  there  has  developed  across 
Europe and  the wider world  a network of regulatory bodies whose authority 
impinges  upon  Member  States,  network  operators,  service  providers, 
equipment manufacturers, customers and consumers.  The manner in  which 
these  regulatory  authorities  have  emerged  has  not  been  based  upon  any 
strategic planning  at  national,  regional  or world-wide levels.  They tended to 
be established to meet needs as those needs have arisen. 
It  is  possible to  discern at a global or European regional level the role of the 
following agencies: 
•  ITU 
•  WTO 
•  CEPT 
5.2  Comments 
It  is  to  be  noted that,  whilst all  Member States are  represented at WTO and 
ITU,  normally there will  be  an  agreed  position taken  by the Member States. 
At  WTO  the  EU  Member  States  will  be  led  by  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Union,  whilst at  ITU  there will  normally,  so  far as  frequency and 
numbering is concerned, be a CEPT position. 
It is immediately obvious that some form of global and regional co-ordination 
is needed for numbering and frequency spectrum.  This view is also reflected 
to some extent in the survey results reported in  Chapter 4.  For other types of 
regulations  that  may  be  set  out  in  order  to  achieve  a  fair  competitive 
environment,  in  particular for international interconnection arrangements,  the 
case for global regulation or Recommendations is less clear. 
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ITU  has  argued  that  it  has  a  role  to  play  in  the  development  of  such 
Recommendations and  in  its  strategic plan for 1999-2003
1  there is an  action 
point to  decide on  the  need  to  revise  the  International  Telecommunications 
Regulations to take account of the WTO agreements. 
In  the  survey  reported  in  Chapter  4,  there  was  one  topic  that  received 
significant support (44%)  for regulatory attention  above the level  of the  EU, 
namely  Internet.  However,  at  the  same  time,  the  respondents  clearly 
indicated that they did not regard Internet as a matter for significant regulatory 
intervention. The question of how and  by whom Internet should  be  regulated 
at the global level, while important, is marginal to the Terms of Reference for 
this  study,  and  it  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  report  to  offer 
Recommendations on  such a complex and far reaching issue.  What we wish 
to do at this point is to  flag  this question as  an  important issue and note that 
the  subject of "Electronic  Commerce"  is  on  the  agenda  for the  Ministerial 
Conference of WTO  in  the fall  of 1999.  It  is  likely thus to form an  important 
part of the next round of international trade negotiations. 
In  conclusion,  the  EU  should  continue  to  monitor  and  liaise  and  provide 
constructive  input  into  ITU,  WTO  and  CEPT.  However,  our  survey  and 
interviews  do  not  suggest  a  requirement  for  new  initiatives  on  regulatory 
structures at this time. 
1  Annexes  to  Resolution  COMS/8  - Strategic  Plan  for the  Union  1999-2003  from  the  ITU 
Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis, October 12 - November 6,  1998. 
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6  NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN EU MEMBER 
STATES 
6.1  Introduction 
The  manner  in  which  legal  and  regulatory  regimes  in  telecommunications 
were developed within the countries which came to be the 15 members of the 
EU  depended  historically  upon  the  individual  initiatives  of those  countries. 
The resultant regimes had traditionally been based on monopolistic control of 
telecommunications. 
However,  with  membership  of the  EU  linked  to  the  sweeping  technological 
changes  in  telecommunications,  new  liberalised  regimes  have  been 
established.  Under  these  regimes  there  have  a  developed  a  number  of 
regulatory institutions, such as: 
•  Ministries; 
•  Independent National Regulatory Authorities; 
•  in some countries:  Radio Communications Authorities; 
•  Competition Authoritities. 
In  addition,  there  are  often  other  specialised  institutions,  bodies  or 
committees that have roles to play within the national regulatory structure that 
deals  with  telecommunications  services.  In  parallel,  there  may  also  be 
separate organisations that deal with the approvals of terminal equipment, but 
this is a subject that falls outside the focus of this report. 
6.2  Commentary 
There  are  three  or  four  key  organisations  at  a  national  level  in  the 
Telecommunications sector: 
• Ministry 
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• Independent National Regulatory Authority 
• Radiocommunications Authority 
• Competition Authority 
•  Ministry and National Regulatory Authority 
Only  in  Ireland  and  Sweden  have  more  or  less  all  regulatory  tasks  (as 
opposed  to  the  formulation  of regulatory  policy)  been  transferred  from  the 
Ministry  to  the  NRA.  However,  also  in  Austria,  Denmark,  Germany  and 
Portugal, the NRA has a fairly complete range of responsibilities. 
In  the other Member States, the regulatory responsibilities are split between 
the Ministries and the NRAs. 
Three  main  areas  where  many  Member  States  have  chosen  to  retain 
regulatory powers in the Ministry are: 
•  Licensing of public networks; 
•  Frequency allocations 
•  Number management 
In  the  table  below,  the  countries  are  distributed  according  to  how many of 
these particular functions are handled by the NRA as opposed to the Ministry 
or another regulatory body. 
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Licences granted by  Licences  granted  by 
the Ministry  the NRA 
Frequency  allocation  or  Belgium  Austria 
Number  management  France  Denmark 
performed  by  or  shared  with  Greece  Germany 
the  Ministry  (or  other  Italy  Portugal 
Government body)  Luxembourg  Spain 
The Netherlands 
UK 
Frequency  allocation  and  Finland  Ireland 
Number  management  Sweden 
performed by NRA 
Table 2 - Regulatory Functions retained in Ministries 
Table 3 below provides a summary and a comparison of how key regulatory 
tasks are arranged within each Member State. 
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1)  General Directorate for Competition,  7)  Consumer Agency 
Consumption (DGCCRF)  8)  National Frequency Agency (ANF) 
2)  Federal Cartel Office  9)  Cartel Office 
3)  Directorate General of Competition and  10)  Radio communications Agency 
Pricing  11)  Radio Agency 
4)  Telecommunications Consumer Board  12)  Ministry of Development 
5)  Telecommunications Complaint Board  (Subdirectorate for Scarce Resources) 
6)  Competition Council  13)  Not yet decided 
Table 3- National Regulatory Bodies in Telecommunications 
•  Competition Authority 
In  some  Member  States,  the  competition  authority  has  played  a  fairly 
significant role  in  shaping  the  national  telecommunications  market.  This  is 
particularly the case  in  Italy.  Also  in  Germany and  Sweden there has  been 
significant involvement by the competition authority. 
In  other  Member  States,  the  competition  authority  has  had  little  or  no 
involvement.  These  are  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg, 
In  the  rest  of  the  Member  States,  there  is  some  involvement  by  the 
competition authority and/or some consultation or co-ordination arrangements 
between it and the N  RA. 
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•  Radiocommunications Authority 
A  few  Member States  have  entrusted  radio  frequency  matter to  a  special 
organisation rather than to the NRA for telecommunications. This is  the case 
in France, the Netherlands and the UK. 
7  EUROPEAN UNION STRUCTURES 
7.1  European Commission 
The Commission acts as  guardian of the  European  Community Treaties and 
is  responsible  for  their  correct  and  full  implementation.  To  this  end,  it 
proposes legislation and provides for the administration of the Community.  Its 
work falls under four headings: 
1.  proposing measures for the further development of Community policy; 
2.  monitoring observance and proper application of Community law; 
3.  administering and implementing Community legislation; 
4.  representing the Community in international organisations. 
While  formal  activities  under  these  headings  are  carried  out  by  the 
Commission  as  a unified  body,  the  actual  regulatory activities that relate  to 
telecommunications  are  carried  out by the  Competition  Directorate  General 
and the Information Society Directorate General respectively. 
7.2  The Need to Streamline Regulatory Institutions at an EU 
Level 
7  .2.1  The Competition Directorate General 
The  position  of the  Competition  Directorate  General,  so  far  as  competition 
issues is concerned, is clear-cut and well established and  no changes on that 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International  Page 30 I 
front  are  envisaged,  save  that  there  is  still  a  need  for  a  programme  of 
information/education.  We  know  of no  move  to  separate  off  any  sector 
specific areas into the ambit and  responsibility of any other Directorate.  It is 
not, therefore, our recommendation that there be changes at the EU level. 
We  do,  however,  recommend that there should  be  a vigorous programme of 
information/education  to  inform  the  sector  players  of  the  roles  and 
responsibilities  of the  Competition  Directorate  General  and  the  Information 
Society Directorate General as they interact with the national markets. 
7.2.2  The Information Society Directorate General 
The future  role  of the  Information  Society  Directorate  General  is  less  clear. 
Presently it is understood that the Information Society Directorate General will 
be subsumed into a new Directorate to deal with the Information Society in  its 
broadest  aspects.  This  may  well  lessen  the  particular  focus  on 
telecommunications  and  place  the  sector within  a wider context.  The  new 
Directorate should  reflect the  way that technology and  communications  are 
central to  business and  society.  At the time of writing,  no  definite decisions 
have been taken. 
7.2.3  ONP/Licensing Committees 
We have set out in  our analysis the roles and responsibilities of the ONP and 
Licensing  Committees.  These  Committees  are  the  product  of  legislation 
(ONP  Directives  and  the  Licensing  Directive).  So  far  as  the  sector  is 
concerned  their roles  are  limited  to  that  of advice,  conciliation  and  dispute 
resolution (except where it concerns technical issues in which circumstances 
the  Committee  may  adopt  changes).  So  far  as  these  Committees  are 
concerned their status and functions have been circumscribed because of the 
limitations  on  their  powers.  These  institutions  were  not  intended  as  key 
players in  the development of the  sector,  but as  mechanisms to  ensure the 
smoother working of the system.  The  minutes of these Committees are  not 
published. 
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These  Committees  do  not  have  a  high  visibility  in  the  sector.  They  are 
permitted  to  liaise  with  Parliament.  Parliamentary  links  have  not  been 
developed.  It is timely to  review their performance to date and to re-visit the 
argument, which we support, that their roles be combined. 
It  may  furthermore  be  noted  that  while  these  Committees  have  been 
established  to  support  the  implementation  of the  ONP  Directives  and  the 
Licensing  Directive,  no  parallel  structure  has  been  established  in  order to 
assist the implementation of the Services Directive.  A question may be raised 
if this creates a bias in  the sense that there is  more communication between 
the  European  Commission  and  the  Member  States  regarding  the  sector 
specific requirements  than  for implementation  issues  related  to  competition 
law. 
It  is  the  opinion  of Eurostrategies/Cullen  International  that just as  an  NRA 
must  take  an  integrated  view  on  sector  specific  and  competition  law 
requirements,  so  must  any  Committee  established  with  a  wider 
telecommunications mandate. 
7.2.4  The High Level Group of National Administrations and Regulatory 
Authorities and the Independent Regulatory Group 
These two  groups  are  comparatively recent institutions.  Their activities  are 
little known outside a small  group of committed telecommunications players. 
The key difference between  these two  groups  is  that the  Commission  is  in 
attendance  at the  High  level  group,  but  not at the  Independent regulatory 
group. 
The High level group is  primarily a policy forum.  Nevertheless, the presence 
of the Commission should result in  a systematic delivery of informed criticism 
of NRA performance and should also mean that Ministries can be informed of 
the extent to which NRAs are or are not performing in line with EU policy. 
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The Independent regulatory group on the other hand is a regulatory club:  it is 
not accountable to  any person or authority.  It is  of recent provenance.  It is 
flexing  its  muscles  and  publishing  papers:  it  is  establishing  a  separate 
identity.  But the extent to which  it is  prepared to be  something more than a 
regulatory club is open to debate.  Such a grouping should be consulted and 
its advice sought, but in terms of accountability it may be of limited value. 
However,  it  could  be  an  important  forum  for  the  development  of a  more 
common view among EU  NRAs on  how to deal with current regulatory issues. 
In  this  context  the  Group  could  be  an  important  meeting  place  in  which 
benchmarking and information exchange on "best practices" could take place. 
It  could  also  be  an  important forum  for the  identification of areas for which 
further Recommendations  or Guidelines would  be  welcomed.  It  could  also 
establish working groups that could provide drafts for such Recommendations 
and Guidelines. 
7.3  THE VALUE ADDED OF A EUROPEAN REGULATOR 
7.3.1  Introduction 
We  have reviewed and  analysed the responses to our questionnaire and the 
roles  of NRA.  In  the  light  of these  discussions  it  is  now  appropriate  to 
consider whether there is value added in establishing a stronger EU  influence 
in  the  national  regulatory  arenas.  In  undertaking  this  task  we  will  bring 
together arguments  already  raised  previously  in  this  report  and  arguments 
which  have  arisen  out  of  the  examination  of  issues  which  we  have 
undertaken. 
We approach this task by considering: 
•  Regulatory options Arguments supportive of an EU Regulator 
•  Arguments against 
•  Regulatory model 
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7.3.2  Institutional Options 
To the question, do you want an  EU Regulator?  It is reasonable to answer "it 
depends on  what is  meant by  an  EU  Regulator".  We  point out that such  a 
Regulator  could  be  based  on  a  model  Oftel,  ART  or  OPTA  which  are 
independent  organisations  which  can  impose  their  will  through 
Decisions/Determinations with  the  force  of law.  Such  regulators  should  be 
consulted  and  advise  on  telecommunications  law-making,  but  their  role 
should  primarily be  to  secure implementation and  enforcement of a regime. 
Alternatively  EU  regulatory  involvement  could  involve  a  lesser  role  as  a 
monitor, a co-ordinator, an institution capable of holding others to account. 
There is much talk today of .. hard law" and "soft law" and the same distinction 
could be made concerning regulators.  If the legislative regime at an  EU  level 
moves  towards  greater  reliance  on  "soft  lawn,  such  as 
Recommendations/Guidelines, so it may be  appropriate in  the context of the 
existing  EU  regime  for  there  to  be  considered  a  role  for  EU  regulatory 
involvement with a lesser role and powers than that of a 
11hard" regulator. 
7.3.3  Arguments Supportive of an EU Regulator 
7.3.3. 1 Building Pan-European Telecommunications 
The  underlying  purpose  of  the  EU  regime  is  to  build  a  Pan-European 
telecommunications environment in  which the sector is  fully liberalised under 
a harmonised regime. 
In  our study we  have  identified that the  achievement of this goal  is  given  a 
high  priority by market players.  On  many occasions, in  interviews, we heard 
the view expressed that there was still  too  wide a discrepancy between  the 
implementation of the EU regime by Member States.  We quote a respondent: 
''National diverging implementation  leads  to  a  competitive  distortion.  Pan-
European  markets  depend  on  consistent  implementation  of Directives: 
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conditions, procedures and fees need to be harmonised." Again we were told 
that regulators were ''too nationalistic".  They lack co-ordination:  "There is  a 
lack of consistency between NRA policy in different countries". 
The conclusion is that positive intervention at an  EU  level to secure consistent 
implementation  would  be  welcomed.  Our  view  is  that  the  appropriate 
approach at this time is through "soft" regulatory control. 
7.3.3.2  Involvement at an EU Level in Existing Regulatory Areas 
Our  study  has  demonstrated  that  respondents  saw  the  need  for  EU 
involvement at a regulatory level, particularly in the following areas: 
•  Pan-European telecommunications 
•  Operators with significant power 
•  Interconnection 
•  Competition 
We  have  dealt with  the  issue  of Pan-European  telecommunications  above. 
Competition law issues at an  EU level are already covered by the Competition 
Directorate General.  As has  been pointed out above, there is a need for the 
roles  of the  Competition  Directorate  General  and  the  Information  Society 
Directorate General to  be  more  clearly perceived  in  the  telecommunications 
sector.  There is  but a  dim  awareness  except amongst professionals as  to 
where the lines of demarcation are drawn.  Indeed it  is fair to state that the 
confusion  at  national  level  as  between  the  competition  authority  and  the 
sector specific regulator is  mirrored  in  the  perception  which  market players 
have of EU institutions. 
The  issues  of "Significant market power"  and  .. Interconnection"  are  in  their 
essence  competition  issues.  Both,  it  might  be  argued,  could  be  dealt with 
under  competition  law,  in  particular  under  the  doctrines  surrounding 
"dominance" and access to "essential facilities".  Nevertheless, ex ante sector 
specific  intervention  in  both  areas  has  resulted  in  the  development  of 
competitive telecommunications in  a way in  which the more legalistic ex post 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International  Page 35 I 
eS. 
Eurostrateg1es 
processes of competition  law could  not have  delivered.  The  New Zealand 
experience  in  Interconnection  provides  a timely  reminder of the  benefits  of 
sector specific regulation. 
It  was  quite  clear from  our survey that  there  was  considerable  criticism  of 
NRAs in the delivery of Interconnection regimes.  Typical comments included: 
"system is  not effective or fair",  "slow decisions and too many delays", "NRA 
takes too long to  resolve disputes", "sloppy and  na'ive",  "no power",  "lack of 
experienced staff'.  There were many other such comments. 
Despite  such  criticism  it  is  doubtful  if  the  establishment  of  a  "hard"  EU 
regulator would solve these problems.  Certain regulatory matters have to be 
dealt with at a national level.  Determination of Interconnection charges is one 
of them.  The EU  has set out its regime in  the  Interconnection  Directive and 
consequential Recommendations: it is a difficult regime.  The reconciliation of 
the  discrepancies between  the top-down  and  the  bottom-up  models of long 
run  incremental costs  is  far from  being  an  easy matter.  And  no  centralised 
EU  regulator could  easily undertake such  a task for individual  EU  Member 
States. 
Further, the possibility of an  EU  regulator having the resources or knowledge 
base to resolve Interconnection disputes in and across 15 EU  Member States 
is remote. 
Interconnection  is  a  matter under consideration  in  another EU  Study.  Our 
view  is  that  Interconnection  requires  and  will  continue  to  require  sector 
specific intervention.  Competition  law cannot,  at  this  stage,  deal  efficiently 
with  all the issues.  That being said,  the EU  should set the framework as  it 
has  done  in  law.  It  should  further  build  on  the  Recommendations  it  has 
issued in the domain of Interconnection.  Detailed implementation has to be at 
a national level. 
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7.3.3.3  New Areas for Regulation 
In  our questionnaire we  asked  respondents to  identify any new areas which 
required  regulatory  intervention.  It  would  indeed  be  surprising  if  sector 
players  unearthed  a  raft of fresh  regulatory topics,  which  had  escaped  the 
attention of the Information Society Directorate General; and, indeed, they did 
not. 
Overall, the regulatory issues for further consideration include: 
•  Convergence 
•  Internet 
•  Access 
•  Convergence 
All of the above subjects may be seen as separate issues or as part 
of the  Convergence  debate.  We  were  specifically  asked  not  to 
investigate the Convergence issue.  However, we are aware of the 
debate in the EU and the paper issued by the Commission following 
the consultation on the Green Paper on Convergence. 
At a regulatory level the issue, in part, involves the question of "how 
many regulatory regimes and  how many regulators?"  Presently in 
most countries  in  the  EU  there  are  two  or three  regulators  in  the 
domains  under  review.  These  are:  the  Telecommunications 
Regulator,  the  Broadcasting  Regulator  and  the 
Radiocommunications  Regulator.  Should  these  regulators  be 
merged? 
Within the Member States there has been no movement yet to the 
merging  of regulators.  Indeed  in  several  Member Countries,  new 
radio laws have but recently established new radiocommunications 
regulators.  Also telecommunications regulators,  as  has  previously 
been  pointed  out,  have  in  many  States  been  just  recently 
established.  There are then institutional reasons in  Member States 
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working against regulatory convergence. 
So  far  as  broadcasting  and  telecommunications  are  concerned 
there  was  "a  very  clear  consensus  that  the  regulation  of 
infrastructure  and  content  required  separate  and  differing 
approaches" (results of the Public Consultation of the Green Paper 
(COM(97)623). 
In  relation  to  radiocommunications,  there  is  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  between  CEPT  and  the  Commission,  which 
preserves  a  key  role  for  CEPT  in  the  regulation  of 
radiocommunications.  This  relationship  would  have  to  be 
renegotiated  if there  were  any consensus  at an  EU  level  for  the 
further convergence  of radio  and  telecommunications.  Our study 
does not reveal to us that there is such a consensus. 
• Internet 
Internet  is,  so  far  as  services  are  concerned,  a  development  of 
revolutionary significance.  However, our survey shows that players 
in the market as of now do not regard this as a matter for significant 
regulatory intervention.  And  in  so far as it is,  it should be dealt with 
at a higher level than the EU. 
It may well be that the market and regulators share a similar 
11hands 
off"  view,  outside  certain  .. content~~ issues.  It  is  not necessary to 
explore the  inherent difficulties in  regulating  a global  phenomenon 
such  as  Internet to  conclude that Internet issues should  not be  a 
cause for the establishment of an  EU  Regulator.  It is,  however, an 
area  in  which  "soft"  regulation,  such  as 
Recommendations/Guidelines could be appropriate. 
• Access 
Access  issues  have  been  addressed  in  the  Commission 
Communication  on  Access  and  explored  in  the  Green  Paper  on 
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Convergence.  Access issues go to "dominance" and "bottlenecks". 
Both  these  matters  are  proper  areas  for  regulatory  intervention. 
Indeed  most  of the  EU  regulators  are  at this  time  wrestling  with 
issues surrounding "unbundling of the local loop". 
Access problems legitimately give rise to the need to sustain an  EU 
regime.  The  establishment  of that  regime  should  be  by  way  of 
Directives:  Recommendations/Guidelines  would  also  be 
appropriate.  It should be the  responsibility of NRAs to secure the 
implementation  of  the  EU  initiative.  The  EU  should  monitor 
implementation and  seek to  ensure a Pan-European  market.  But 
this, of itself, is not a conclusive argument for the establishment of 
an EU regulator. 
7.3.3.4  Non-Independence of  National Regulatory Authorities 
The EU Regime calls for NRAs to be separate from "operationsll and separate 
from  "ownership".  In  this  way  independence  was  to  be  established. 
However,  it  has  also  been  suggested  that  an  EU  regulator  should  be 
established because of the non-independence of NRAs in  practice.  How real 
are these arguments? 
•  Regulatory Capture 
It has been suggested that NRAs are susceptible to regulatory capture by the 
Incumbent operator.  Such capture may come about in two ways. 
Firstly,  the  weight  of  resources,  the  skill  and  knowledge  of  regulatory 
personnel, which the Incumbent operator can put into regulatory matters, may 
be such that it can "swamp" the limited resources of the regulator.  Ultimately 
effective  regulation  depends on  flows  of information  from,  in  particular,  the 
Incumbent  operator.  The  manner  in  which  these  information  flows  are 
presented will be  in  no small measure a matter for the operator.  Arguments 
and positions can  be  persuasively presented in  a manner in which it may well 
be easy for a regulator to accept. 
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A  different  form  of regulatory  capture  arises  through  the  need  to  employ 
experienced  staff.  The  most  obvious  location  for  experienced  staff  is  the 
Incumbent operator.  In  at least one regulator, the presence of former staff of 
the  Incumbent  operator  has  caused  disquiet.  NRAs  have  to  exercise 
considerable care in their employment policies. 
Our  enquiries  and  interviews,  however,  do  not  lead  us  to  the  view  that 
"Regulatory Capture"  is  a  major issue.  It is,  however,  a  matter to  be  kept 
under review. 
•  Government Intervention 
There  have  been  several  comments  made  to  us  in  our  survey  and  in 
interviews, which suggest that Governments may be  less than scrupulous in 
11leaning  ..  directly or indirectly on  regulators.  In some European countries this 
may result from the manner in which the regulator is established.  In France, it 
is  clearly  stated  that  regulatory  responsibilities  are  shared  between  the 
Ministry and  ART.  In  the UK policy is  made by the DTI  in  consultation with 
Oftel.  In  Belgium  regulatory  impartiality  may  be  questioned  because  of 
Government ownership of Belgacom. 
How significant are these complaints?  Lack of resources  does constitute  a 
problem.  But perhaps the best barometer of independence of NRA is  in  the 
relationship between the NRA and the Incumbent operators.  If it is somewhat 
11Strained  ..  that may be  an  indicator of independence.  Whatever,  NRAs and 
operators/service providers should not have close/friendly relationships.  That 
is not the purpose of a regulatory regime. 
But even if a dossier of complaints on these fronts could be developed, would 
it  justify  a  European  Regulatory  Authority?  Probably  not.  NRAs  are 
answerable, usually, to national institutions in  the first instance.  Only if such 
accountability fails should an EU regulator become involved, possibly. 
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7.3.4  Arguments Against the Establishment of an EU Regulator 
7.3.4. 1  Bureaucracy/Delay 
We  asked  our  interviewees  what  the  downside  of the  establishment  of a 
European  regulator would  be,  and  they invariably replied  "an  extra  layer of 
bureaucracy  and  delay".  Most  operators/service  providers  are  working  for 
short-term solutions to immediate problems.  They envisage a long  period of 
political  debate and  haggling  prior to the  establishment of any EU  regulator 
with  indefinite  results  to  follow  some  time  in  the  future.  Some  of  the 
comments we received included "an ERA would result in  extra cost and time"; 
"an ERA will slow the whole process and cost time and money"; "a European 
regulator  will  mean  more  bureaucracy  and  more  costs  and  unneeded 
institution". 
7.3.4.2  Definition of  Role, Responsibilities and Powers 
The constitutional,  legal and  political  problems associated with  clarifying the 
role,  responsibilities  and  power of an  EU  regulator goes in  particular to  the 
establishment of a "hard" regulator.  Major issues  relating to the principle of 
subsidiarity will be raised.  Should regulatory areas be taken from NRAs and if 
so, which ones?  Should regulatory powers be removed and transferred to an 
EU  regulator?  How should these powers be exercised?  What would be the 
consequence  for  national  regulatory  authorities  and  the  recently  enacted 
Telecommunications Laws?  Our survey provided no support that this level of 
surgery to the existing regime should be undertaken. 
Further, as one interviewee put it: "if an  EU  regulator is established, no direct 
relationship will exist between the regulator and those regulated". 
These difficulties have been more specifically addressed in  the NERA Study. 
Technical  solutions  have been  proposed.  However,  the  establishment of a 
"hard  ..  EU regulator would demand a consensus of approach at a political and 
operator level which is not present on the evidence of our study. 
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7.3.4.3  The Wrong Issue is being Addressed 
The view that the wrong issue is being addressed is given expression in some 
of the interviews and comments which we received. 
Thus .. the best way to promote the development of a Pan-European market is 
not the refinement of the present sector specific regulation but its removal so 
far  as  is  possible.  Not  a  European  regulator  but  competition  and 
convergence will bring about the desired Pan-European market.  The future is 
with general (competition) law and not sector specific regulation." 
The  issue  of whether there  should  be  sector specific  regulation  alongside 
competition rules has been vigorously debated in  the Commission Document 
.. Results  of the  Public  Consultation  on  the  Green  Paper - COM(1999)1 08 
Final  ... 
Whilst it is persuasive that the goal should  be a sector regulated only by the 
operation  of Competition  law,  and  whilst  it  is  the  case  that  the  market  is 
becoming  more competitive both  at a fixed,  mobile and  fixed  mobile  level  it 
would, however, in  our opinion be premature to recommend the withdrawal of 
sector specific regulation.  It is,  however,  appropriate to  quote from  another 
comment to underline the objective of a sector regulated  by competition.  "A 
former  monopolist  requires  regulation.  However  regulatory  measures  are 
meant to further competition.  Therefore, as soon as  a market or sectors are 
competitive  and  a  dominant  position  of the  provider  no  longer  exists  the 
original  objective  of  regulation  is  achieved.  In  this  moment  general 
competition law must replace sector specific regulation." 
7.4  Recommendations 
7.4.1  The EU should more fully develop and encourage the institutions 
and regime already to hand 
The EU  has established clearly that it has the will and the means to transform 
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telecommunications  in  the  EU  through  its  legislative programme,  which  has 
materially  and  dramatically  shifted  the  EU  towards  a  multi-operator  multi-
service/multi-equipment  supplier  environment.  Liberalisation  and 
harmonisation are now an  integral part of the telecommunications agenda in 
all the Member States.  The requirement at this point is more fully to secure 
implementation of EU Directives. 
We quote from our interviewees:  "there is  need for greater harmonisation in 
the  EU";  "it  is  not  the  first  priority to  create  an  ERA.  The  first  need  is  to 
remedy inconsistencies in the national interpretation of EU rules." 
The Commission has at its disposal the following instruments: 
•  The Competition Directorate General - if issues of cross-border EU 
trade are involved; 
•  Article  226  letters through which  a demand for an  explanation  of 
non-conformance may be required; 
•  ONP Committee 
•  Licensing Committee 
•  The  Enforcement  section  of the  Information  Society  Directorate 
General 
So  far as  many  of those  who  answered  our  survey  are  concerned  these 
instruments would be sufficient to promote a harmonised regime in  the EU,  if 
they were  more  effectively  and  diligently  utilised.  In  addition,  many  of the 
respondents  would  welcome a means whereby a  complaint could  be  made 
quickly  and  effectively  to  the  EU  against  an  NRA  which  would  not  act 
pursuant  to  the  requirements  of the  EU  regime.  Existing  remedies  of the 
Information  Society  Directorate  General  are  not  providing  a  satisfactory 
mechanism to the market. 
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7.4.2  Promotion of New Institutions 
•  High Level Group 
The EU  itself has promoted a role for a High level group:  the Commission is 
present on  this group.  It should be  more specifically encouraged and further 
it should promote itself more professionally.  It should publish the minutes of 
its meetings.  Very few market players know of its existence, what it does, or 
what are the outcomes of its deliberations. 
•  Independent Group of Regulators 
This  is  an  ad hoc organisation  of regulators.  It  is  a  closed  group.  It  is 
accountable to  no  one.  However,  it  does  enable  regulators  to  review and 
analyse  problems  common  to  them  all.  It  has  begun  to  develop  common 
positions  and  to  promote  itself  on  the  Internet.  Care  should  be  taken  to 
ensure that such  common  positions are  compatible  with  the  EU  regime.  It 
should  perhaps  make  itself  more  accessible  to  operators/providers/users. 
The organisation should not and could  not become a complaints forum, but it 
should at least be informed regularly of the extent to which various regulatory 
regimes are failing  to  meet EU  requirements.  It should be  encouraged in  its 
publication of papers on  key regulatory issues and  it should be  consulted on 
new legislation and Guidelines/Recommendations. 
7.4.3  EU Implementation Reports- EU Parliament Involvement 
EU  Implementation  Reports  provide  a  mechanism  by  which  regulatory 
regimes  can  be  reviewed  and  measured  against  EU  requirements.  This 
instrument  should  be  more  fully  developed  to  set  out  non-compliance  in 
regulatory regimes.  However,  presently the  Implementation  Reports  do  not 
receive sufficient publicity.  A way in  which such  publicity could  be  achieved 
and  in  a manner to  cause an  errant NRA to  enforce its  regime would  be to 
secure  the  examination  of  these  reports  before  a  Committee  of  the 
Parliament.  The Committee should have power to call witnesses and cross-
examine.  In  this  way  added  impetus  could  be  given  to  the  causes  of 
implementation and harmonisation. 
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7.4.4  A Regulatory Model for the Future 
What then, should be the approach for the EU?  We set out our views thus: 
•  There  is  an  existing  body  of EU  law the  implementation  of which 
needs to be thoroughly monitored. 
•  The EU  has adopted the principle of legislating through  Framework 
Directives ("hard" law).  This principle should be maintained. 
•  Directives should be supplemented by Recommendations/Guidelines 
("soft" law). 
•  Recommendations/Guidelines  should  be  drawn  up  only  after  full 
consultation  with  such  entities  as  the  High  level  group,  the 
Independent  group  of  regulators  and  the  European 
Telecommunications  Platform.  Indeed,  such  bodies  should  be 
encouraged  to  draw  up  and  submit  draft 
Recommendations/Guidelines. 
•  Member  States  should  agree  to  sign  up  to  such 
Recommendations/Guidelines  as  a  consequence  of  implementing 
Directives.  By  signing  up,  Member  States  should  be  held 
accountable for adhering to them.  If not signing up,  Member States 
may be required to justify why. 
•  The  Enforcement  sections  of the  Information  Society  Directorate 
General  and  the  Competition  Directorate  General  should  be 
strengthened  and  their  co-ordination  should  be  further  developed. 
They should publish a common Implementation Report which should 
have the character of a regulatory audit. 
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•  Monitoring the  implementation of Directives,  Recommendations and 
Guidelines  should  be  the  responsibility of a  new Committee  of the 
EU.  This  Committee would take on  the  responsibilities  of the ONP 
and  Licensing Committees and  in  addition have responsibility for the 
implementation  of  the  Services  Directive.  It  should  advise  the 
Enforcement section  of the  Information Society Directorate  General 
as well as the  Regulatory Development section.  It should liaise with 
the  Competition  Directorate  General.  This  Committee  should  be 
given the necessary resources to undertake these responsibilities. 
•  The  Committee  should  be  responsible  for  publishing  the 
Implementation Reports and for delivering them to the EU  Parliament 
for examination by an appropriate Parliamentary committee. 
•  The  EU  should  continually  and  consistently  monitor  the 
telecommunications regime to gauge the extent to which the market 
has become competitive and regulation step-by-step may be handed 
over to control through the Competition law regime. 
7.5  Conclusion 
We  have  critically  reviewed  the  various  options.  The  case  for a  radical 
departure in setting up a nhardn independent EU  regulator has not been made 
out.  That there remains a requirement for EU  involvement  is~  however~ firmly 
established.  That involvement should be carried out through the mechanisms 
we have set out above.  Our overall conclusions and  Recommendations are 
set out hereinafter. 
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8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We review our conclusions thus: 
8.1  Results of Survey 
8.1.1  Overall 
1.  The  following  regulatory  areas were  identified  as of high  importance  by 
more than 70% of respondents: 
•  Competition 
•  Interconnection 
•  Frequency allocation and assignment 
•  Number management and allocation 
2.  N  RAs  were  managing  their  responsibilities  to  an  average  level  of 
satisfaction,  but there  were  significant  elements  of dissatisfaction  when 
considering specific regulatory topics and/or geographic regions. 
3.  Only  in  or about  50%  thought  the  national  structures  were  efficient  to 
manage the  regulatory requirements,  but there  was  little  support for the 
contention that there are too many Regulators. 
4.  Respondents  saw  a  role  for  both  national  and  EU  involvement  in 
regulation with,  in  most cases,  a bias toward  national regulatory solution. 
5.  There was limited support for a wider than EU  role, except in  the areas of 
frequency spectrum and Internet. 
6.  Self-regulation attracted very low support. 
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7.  Ad hoc initiatives received little support. 
8.  The highest level for support for an  ERA was in  the areas of Competition, 
Interconnection,  SMP  and  Development  of  a  Pan-European  market. 
However, only for Competition, where the Competition Directorate General 
is  already a  European  Authority,  does  the  level  of support climb  above 
50°/o. 
9.  The level of support for an  ERA is clearly negatively related to the level of 
satisfaction  with  the  NRA.  Where  there  is  dissatisfaction  with  the 
performance  of  an  NRA,  there  is  generally  more  support  for  EU 
involvement and ERA. 
1  O.lf the regulatory function  is at an  EU  level, then  there is  no clear cut view 
as to whether Guidance/Recommendation or binding decisions should  be 
operational:  SMP, Interconnection, Competition, Numbering, Enforcement 
are areas where binding decisions are preferred. 
•  Regional Groupings 
11. The Northern group (Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK)  are  tending  to  a  more  market-orientated  approach  than  other  EU 
countries. 
12.1n  the  Southern  group  (Italy,  France,  Portugal  and  Spain)  groups 
management by the  NRA was  considered  "poor"  in  all  areas  other than 
General  licences,  Competition,  USO,  Frequency  and  Consumer 
protection. 
13. The Southern  group registered the highest support for intervention at an 
EU  level  and  also  the  strongest support for an  ERA with  support falling 
below 40% only in Licensing and Internet. 
•  Sector Groupings 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International  Page 48 I 
eS. 
Eurostrateg1es 
14. Not surprisingly, Incumbents regard Tariff control and SMP as significantly 
less important than Regulators, Users, Consumers and New operators. 
15. There  was  a  higher  level  of  dissatisfaction  with  NRAs  amongst  New 
operators than amongst Incumbents. 
8.1.2  Institutions 
16. Key  regulatory  institutions  are  established  in  all  EU  Member  States  in 
telecommunications,  radiocommunications  and  competition  and  are 
operating at varying degrees of competence and efficiency. 
17. NRAs  are  generally separate from  operations  and  ownership.  The  fact 
that  some  operators  are  still  partially  under  the  ownership  of  the 
Government can  reflect  on  the  independence  of the  regulator:  further, 
there  are  still  countries  in  the  EU  where  that  independence  may  be 
undermined by Ministries and operators. 
18. There  is  some  confusion  at  a  national  level  as  to  the  demarcation  line 
between the competition authorities and the NRA. 
19. The GNP/Licensing Committees have an  unclear role in  the market place. 
The status of these Committees is low. 
20. New quasi-regulatory  bodies  are  emerging,  i.e.  the  High  level  group  of 
administrations  and  regulatory  authorities,  the  Independent  group  of 
regulators and  the  European  Telecommunications  Platform.  These  new 
institutions can play a key role. 
21. The  Information  Society  Directorate  General  Implementation  Reports  of 
the EU  are valuable contributions to EU  regulatory analysis but they could 
be more efficiently used as an instrument of change. 
8.1.3  Regulatory Functional Inadequacies 
22.1n some countries, Licensing is the province of NRAs and  is of diminishing 
significance.  Other  EU  States  remain  heavily  locked  into  individual 
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licences and licensing regimes.  Schemes for General Authorisations need 
to be used more widely. 
23. There  is  a  large  measure  of  dissatisfaction  with  Interconnection 
management by NRAs. 
8.1.4  Institutional Streamlining 
24. NRAs  can  properly  undertake  more  regulatory  responsibility  from 
Ministries. 
25. Member  States  should  make  the  decision  as  to  whether  or  not 
radiocommunication regulation should  be  merged with telecommunication 
regulation. 
26. Member  States  need  to  monitor  that  the  institutional  duopoly  of 
radiocommunications and  telecommunications Regulators does not cause 
any undue delays. 
27. There  is  scope  for  clarifying  the  functions  of  NRAs  and  Competition 
authorities. 
8.1.5  New Areas 
28. The  present situation  broadly encompasses the  regulatory  needs  of the 
telecommunications sector.  However,  new areas which  need  addressing 
are: 
•  Access 
•  Internet 
•  Convergence 
8.1.6  EU  Regulator 
29. There is not an immediate requirement to set up an EU Regulator. 
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30. EU  level involvement, particularly in  the area of implementation,  is  a key 
requirement in telecommunications in the EU. 
31. Existing regulatory tools should be more focused. 
8.2  Recommendations 
8.2.1  Background 
The overall  results  indicate a significant level of support for EU  involvement 
for issues that are closely related to competition and to the establishment of a 
Pan-European telecommunications  market.  For other regulatory topics,  the 
support for EU  involvement is less convincing and even where the support for 
EU  involvement  is  high,  there  is  not  support  for  the  having  a  "European 
Regulatory Authority".  Only in  the  case  of competition  matters  (where  the 
Competition  Directorate  General  already  exists  as  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority) is there a majority in favour of such a solution. 
This view from the analysis of the numbers coming back from questionnaires 
is  further  strengthened  when  taking  into  account  comments  made  during 
interviews and otherwise.  A general impression is that most organisations do 
not want a EU regulatory authority that of the NRAs set up in Member States. 
At the same time as the results of the study come short of giving support for a 
new European Regulatory Authority, there is  a strong view in favour of doing 
more within the current regulatory structure.  The great importance attached 
to the  achievement of a  Pan-European  market (with  corresponding  support 
for  EU  involvement)  suggests  that  more  emphasis  should  be  given  to  this 
area. 
During  interviews,  many organisations  expressed  support for the  notion  of 
"soft"  Regulations,  with  emphasis  on  Guidelines  and  Recommendations 
rather than Directives and Decisions from the EU.  In addition, there was also 
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support for the  principle  of regulatory  forbearance,  whereby  certain  sector 
specific regulations would cease to apply when certain objective criteria would 
be met. 
8.2.2  Development of Telecommunications Regulatory Regime 
The  EU,  following  the  1999  Review  should  establish  a  clear  set  of 
objectives/principles  on  which  the  development  of the  sector  in  the  next 
decade.  (We  have  set out a series  of such  principles  in  section  2.2 of the 
report).  Sector specific regulations a key element in  a context in which there 
should  be  a  move  to  greater reliance  on  competition  law.  The  EU  should 
continue  to  utilise  and  develop  a  combination  of  hard  law  (Framework 
Directives) and soft law (Recommendations/Guidelines). 
8.2.3  Harmonisation Programme 
We recommend that the following  elements be  considered to secure a more 
harmonised regime: 
8.2.3. 1  Improve Co-operation between NRAs 
Improved  co-operation  between  NRAs  in  order  to  improve  common 
understanding  of EU  Directives  and  implementation  approaches  should  be 
promoted:  The  High  Level  Group  and  The  Independent Regulators  Group 
have key roles to play in this regard. 
8.2.3.2  Regulatory Areas suitable for Recommendations/Guidelines 
Organisations such as CEPT/ECTRA, Independent Regulators Group and the 
European  Telecommunications  Platform,  in  addition  to  the  European 
Commission,  should  identify  and  nominate  regulatory  areas  for  which 
guidance is needed. 
8.2.3.3  Drafting of  Recommendations/Guidelines 
The  same  organisations  which  can  nominate  regulatory  areas  should  also 
provide drafts. 
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8.2.3.4  Procedure  for  Public  Comments  for  Recommendations/ 
Guidelines 
A  procedure  for  public  comment  should  be  established,  similar  to  that 
following the publication of a Green Paper. 
8.2.3.5 Acceptance of  Recommendations/Guidelines 
A  procedure should  be  established  whereby Member States should  publicly 
state  that  they  will  subscribe  to  Recommendations/Guidelines. 
Recommendations/Guidelines should  be  incorporated  into  national  regimes. 
The  Implementation  Reports  should  monitor  adherence  to  the 
Recommendations/Guidelines.  If they are ignored, then it may be necessary 
for  the  EU  to  introduce  legal  requirements  through  the  enactment  of 
Directives. 
8.2.3.6  Control 
The  Implementation  Reports  which  the  European  Commission  produces 
today  should  be  expanded  also  to  include  the  status  of  acceptance  of 
Guidelines and control against Guidelines for those Member States that have 
subscribed to them.  The  Implementation  Reports  should  be  expanded  into 
having the status of"  Audit Reportsll. 
8.2.3.7 Public Scrutiny of ulmplementation Reports" 
The "Implementation Reports" should be given high public focus, for example 
by  having  the  European  Parliament  arrange  audit  hearings  whereby  the 
Commission  and  Member  States  could  have  the  opportunity  to  report  on 
measures to  improve those areas that have drawn  audit remarks and justify 
where Guidelines have not been subscribed to. 
8.2.4  Programme for Co-ordination of Competition Issues 
The  various  regulatory  topics  within  the  telecommunications  sector overlap 
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with  competition  law to  a varying degree.  In  many practical cases,  both the 
Competition authority and the NRA for telecommunications have roles to play. 
The  responses  to  the  questionnaire  uncovered  some  confusion  about  the 
division  of responsibility  between  the  two  authorities  and  it  is  an  area  of 
concern  as  many elements of telecommunications sector specific legislation 
are  expected  gradually to  give way to  general  competition  law in  the years 
ahead. 
In  particular,  if  sector  specific  regulations  include  sunset  clauses  that  will 
require  interpretation,  it  will  be  necessary for both  authorities  to  achieve  a 
consensus on whether the sunset clause should be activated. 
Where two  authorities are  engaged  in  the  same  issue,  there  is  always  the 
possibility that there  will  be  two  different positions.  Engaging  two  different 
authorities for the  same  issue  may require  additional time  and  resource for 
the organisations involved. 
It is  a fact that it is the competition issues that draws highest support for EU 
involvement.  It is also fact that the Competition Directorate General is already 
a well-established and respected European authority.  It is therefore tempting 
to make a suggestion to  look for ways  whereby the Competition  Directorate 
General  could  have  a clearer and  more  active  role  to  play in  issues where 
sector specific legislation and competition law overlap. 
We recommend a programme of co-ordination of competition issues whereby: 
1.  Member States  should  ensure that the roles  of the  competition  authority 
and  the N  RA  are fully coordinated  and  clarified  so that that is  clear at a 
national level to which authority anti-competitive issues should be directed 
- and we recommend that that authority should be the NRA. 
2.  an  organisation that requires  regulatory intervention  or support would  be 
assured that a decision takes  account of both  sector specific regulations 
and competition law; 
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3.  national appeal  processes should reflect the fact that  decisions may be 
appealed on the basis of competition law as well as sector specific law; 
4.  the  Competition  Directorate  General  should  clarify  procedures  and/or 
regulatory issues whereby common approaches to be adopted by Member 
States  based  on  competition  law could  be  determined  at  the  European 
level.  This  is  particularly  important  in  the  context  of the  policy  of  the 
Competition Directorate General to  refer more cases to national tribunals 
for decision. 
5.  more  information  concerning  the  role  and  availability of DGIV should  be 
encouraged. 
8.2.5  Streamlining of Institutions 
•  Member States  should  devolve  more  responsibility  and  power to 
NRAs, in particular in the areas of licensing and tariffs. 
•  Member States should determine the extent to  which there should 
be  convergence  between  telecommunications,  radio 
communications  and  broadcasting  regulators.  The  case  is  not 
made for any "forced" convergence. 
•  The EU  should review the extent to which the ONP and  Licensing 
Committees are performing a useful role.  Presently, deliberately or 
otherwise,  they  are  viewed  as  low  profile  entities.  Their  roles 
should be  clarified. Rather than having several Committees, a case 
may be  made for having  one  Telecommunications Committee that 
would  be  responsible  for  a  co-ordinated  approach  to  the 
implementation  of all  the  telecommunications  Directives  including 
the  Services  Directive.  In  any  event  the  minutes  of  these 
Committees should be published. 
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•  The  High  level  group  and  the  Independent  group  of  regulators 
should  be  promoted  and  encouraged.  The  development of "soft" 
law  properly  should  involve  consultation  with  these  bodies  and 
other  such  institutions  as  the  European  Telecommunications 
Platform. 
8.2.6  Commission Powers 
The Commission should fully  utilise its  powers to  carry out investigations of 
anti-competitive  behaviour  as  in  the  recent  investigations  into  fixed/mobile 
charges. 
The  Commission  should  continue  when  appropriate  to  issue  "Article  226 
letters".  In this context more publicity should be used. 
8.2. 7  Conclusion 
The possibility for role of an  EU Regulator is not a closed issue.  It is a matter 
which  should  be  kept under review.  But at this  stage,  the argument for its 
establishment is not made out. 
Ref:  Rp61140 
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